| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
a |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
230929b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
9783110772838 |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
332.4 |
| Item number |
WAR |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Warren, Micah |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Bitcoin : a game-theoretic analysis |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
De Gruyter, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2023 |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Berlin : |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
xv, 328 p. ; |
| Other physical details |
ill., |
| Dimensions |
24 cm |
| 365 ## - TRADE PRICE |
|---|
| Price amount |
69.95 |
| Price type code |
EUR |
| Unit of pricing |
109.80 |
| 490 ## - SERIES STATEMENT |
|---|
| Series statement |
De Gruyter Graduate |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
The definitive guide to the game-theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin's security model. The book begins with an overview of probability and game theory. Nakamoto Consensus is discussed in both practical and theoretical terms. This volume: Describes attacks and exploits with mathematical justifications, including selfish mining. Identifies common assumptions such as the Market Fragility Hypothesis, establishing a framework for analyzing incentives to attack. Outlines the block reward schedule and economics of ASIC mining. Discusses how adoption by institutions would fundamentally change the security model. Analyzes incentives for double-spend and sabotage attacks via stock-flow models. Overviews coalitional game theory with applications to majority takeover attacks. Presents Nash bargaining with application to unregulated environments. This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Explains the game theoretic underpinning of Bitcoin from inception to large-scale adoption. Combines basics of game theory, probability and the Proof-of-Work protocol. Includes end of chapter exercises, and python code snippets. |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Smart contracts |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Selfish mining |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Schelling point |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Nash bargaining solution |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Market fragility hypothesis |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Block reward |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Bernoulli processes |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Backwards induction |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
E-Commerce |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
|
| Item type |
Books |