000 a
999 _c30566
_d30566
008 220321b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 _a9780197552384
082 _a006
_bSHA
100 _aShagrir, Oron
245 _aNature of physical computation
260 _bOxford University Press,
_c2022
_aNew York :
300 _a312 p. ;
_bill.,
_c25 cm
365 _b99.00
_cUSD
_d78.80
490 _aOxford studies in philosophy of science
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 _aComputing systems are everywhere today. Even the brain is thought to be a sort of computing system. But what does it mean to say that a given organ or system computes? What is it about laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems that they are deemed to compute, and why does it seldom occur to us to describe stomachs, hurricanes, rocks, or chairs that way? The book provides an extended argument for the semantic view of computation, which states that semantic properties are involved in the nature of computing systems. Laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems compute because they are accompanied by representations. Stomachs, hurricanes, and rocks, for instance, which do not have semantic properties, do not compute. The first part of the book argues that the linkage between the mathematical theory of computability and the notion of physical computation is weak. Theoretical notions such as algorithms, effective procedure, program, and automaton play only a minor role in identifying physical computation. The second part of the book reviews three influential accounts of physical computation and argues that while none of these accounts is satisfactory, each of them highlights certain key features of physical computation. The final part of the book develops and argues for a semantic account of physical computation and offers a characterization of computational explanations.
650 _aComputer science
650 _aPhilosophy
650 _aSemantic computing
650 _aComputers, Philosophy
650 _aCharacterization
650 _a Cognitive
650 _aCopeland
650 _aModeling
650 _a Notion objective
650 _aPhysical system
650 _aPiccinini
650 _a Step structure
650 _aTurning machine
942 _2ddc
_cBK