000 a
999 _c30694
008 220322b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 _a9780192897930
082 _a170.92
100 _aLeiter, Brian
245 _aMoral psychology with Nietzsche
260 _bOxford University Press,
_aOxford :
300 _ax, 198 p. ;
_c24 cm
365 _b19.99
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 _aBrian Leiter defends a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts and reasoning play almost no significant role in our actions and how our lives unfold. Leiter presents a new interpretation of main themes of Nietzsche's moral psychology, including his anti-realism about value (including epistemic value), his account of moral judgment and its relationship to the emotions, his conception of the will and agency, his scepticism about free will and moral responsibility, his epiphenomenalism about certain kinds of conscious mental states, and his views about the heritability of psychological traits. In combining exegesis with argument, Leiter engages the views of philosophers like Harry Frankfurt, T. M. Scanlon, and Gary Watson, and psychologists including Daniel Wegner, Benjamin Libet, and Stanley Milgram. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in both philosophy and psychology.
650 _aNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 844-1900
650 _aEthics, Modern 19th century
650 _aPsychology and philosophy
650 _aMoral development
650 _aSocial psychology
650 _aPsychological aspects
650 _aEthical aspects
650 _aAction
650 _a Affect
650 _aArgument
650 _aBelief
650 _aCause
650 _a Claims
650 _aConscious
650 _a Fact
650 _aFeelings
650 _a Reasons
650 _aResponsibility
650 _aBehavior
650 _aCognitive
650 _aDesire
650 _aMotivation
650 _a Skepticism
942 _2ddc