000			a
999			_c32140 _d32140
008			230929b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9783110772838
082			_a332.4 _bWAR
100			_aWarren, Micah
245			_aBitcoin : a game-theoretic analysis
260			_bDe Gruyter, _c2023 _aBerlin :
300			_axv, 328 p. ; _bill., _c24 cm
365			_b69.95 _cEUR _d109.80
490			_aDe Gruyter Graduate
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aThe definitive guide to the game-theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin's security model. The book begins with an overview of probability and game theory. Nakamoto Consensus is discussed in both practical and theoretical terms. This volume: Describes attacks and exploits with mathematical justifications, including selfish mining. Identifies common assumptions such as the Market Fragility Hypothesis, establishing a framework for analyzing incentives to attack. Outlines the block reward schedule and economics of ASIC mining. Discusses how adoption by institutions would fundamentally change the security model. Analyzes incentives for double-spend and sabotage attacks via stock-flow models. Overviews coalitional game theory with applications to majority takeover attacks. Presents Nash bargaining with application to unregulated environments. This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Explains the game theoretic underpinning of Bitcoin from inception to large-scale adoption. Combines basics of game theory, probability and the Proof-of-Work protocol. Includes end of chapter exercises, and python code snippets.
650			_aSmart contracts
650			_aSelfish mining
650			_aSchelling point
650			_aNash bargaining solution
650			_aMarket fragility hypothesis
650			_aBlock reward
650			_aBernoulli processes
650			_aBackwards induction
650			_aE-Commerce
942			_2ddc _cBK