000			a
999			_c32293 _d32293
008			231010b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780262038621
082			_a179 _bGUN
100			_aGunkel, David J.
245			_aRobot rights
260			_bMIT Press, _c2018 _aCambridge :
300			_axiv, 237 p. ; _c24 cm.
365			_b2850.00 _cINR _d01
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aWe are in the midst of a robot invasion, as devices of different configurations and capabilities slowly but surely take up increasingly important positions in everyday social reality-self-driving vehicles, recommendation algorithms, machine learning decision-making systems, and social robots of various forms and functions. Although considerable attention has already been devoted to the subject of robots and responsibility, the question concerning the social status of these artifacts has been largely overlooked. In this book, David Gunkel offers a provocative attempt to think about what has been previously regarded as unthinkable: whether and to what extent robots and other technological artifacts of our own making can and should have any claim to moral and legal standing.In his analysis, Gunkel invokes the philosophical distinction (developed by David Hume) between "is" and "ought" in order to evaluate and analyze the different arguments regarding the question of robot rights. In the course of his examination, Gunkel finds that none of the existing positions or proposals hold up under scrutiny. In response to this, he then offers an innovative alternative proposal that effectively flips the script on the is/ought problem by introducing another, altogether different way to conceptualize the social situation of robots and the opportunities and challenges they present to existing moral and legal systems.
650			_aRobots Moral and ethical aspects
650			_aRobots
650			_aArtificial intelligence
650			_aEthics
650			_aLaw
650			_aRight
650			_aHuman factors
942			_2ddc _cBK