000			a
999			_c33858 _d33858
008			250408b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780521537360
082			_a401.43 _bREC
100			_aRecanati, Francoise
245			_aLiteral meaning
260			_bCambridge University Press, _c2004 _aCambridge :
300			_aviii, 179 p. ; _bill. (some col.), _c23 cm.
365			_b28.99 _c£ _d113.80
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aAccording to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to merely implied) determined by linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface.
650			_aLanguage Arts & Disciplines
650			_aPragmatics
650			_aLiteralism
650			_aContextualism
650			_aIndexicalism
650			_aBinding Fallacy
650			_aSemantics
942			_2ddc _cBK